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EQUITABLE TOLLING 
DENIED: UNIFORM 
STANDARD BREAKS ABUSER'S 
CONTROL WITHIN DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 
Laura E. Petkovich 
I. Introduction 
The Office of Children's Issues is 
one of the fastest growing offices in the U.S. 
State Department, largely due to the rising 
rate of international abductions involving 
children with American parents.1 The 
National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children reported that in 2010, nearly 2,000 
parental abductions occurred in which a 
parent took the child or children out of the 
United States.2 While not all of these 
abductions were motivated by a need to 
escape from an abusive home situation, such 
motivations are a common occurrence in 
today's society as the majority of 
international parental child abductors is 
custodial mothers who claim to be fleeing 
from violent partners.3 
Lozano v. Alvarez 4 is a case in which a 
mother left the father of her child in the 
United Kingdom and brought her child to the 
United States, specifically New York, to 
escape the physical, emotional, and verbal 
abuse that she endured during the 
relationship.5 The United States Supreme 
Court evaluated the case under the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction (Convention) 
and established the application and 
interpretation of the exceptions explicitly set 
forth within the Convention, particularly the 
"well-settled" exception.6 In so doing, the 
Court correctly took an important step and 
created much needed uniformity by 
establishing that equitable tolling may not 
apply to the "well-settled" exception of the 
Hague Convention.7 This ruling in Lozano will 
prevent abusers from using child custody to 
control their victims and effectively continue 
the abuse in those abductions motivated by 
domestic abuse. 
This Note will first look at the facts 
and holding of Lozano and how prior courts 
rationalized their findings based on the same 
facts. It will then look at the laws regarding 
international child abduction, specifically the 
"well-settled" exception, and how several 
circuits have considered the application of 
equitable tolling under such circumstances. I 
will next examine the analysis of the Supreme 
Court. Finally, this Note will explain why 
uniformity on the issue of equitable tolling 
was necessary throughout the United States 
and examine the positive impact that the 
ruling will likely have on protecting victims of 
domestic violence. 
II. Facts and Holdings 
Manuel Jose Lozano (Petitioner) and 
Diana Lucia Montoya Alvarez (Respondent) 
were born in Colombia. They entered into a 
relationship in early 2004 while each resided 
in London, United Kingdom.8 Although the 
pair was never married, Petitioner moved 
into Respondent's flat approximately three 
months after they started dating, and they 
had a child together on October 21, 2005.9 
Respondent alleged that the mistreatment 
against her began one month after they 
moved in together.10 She claimed that 
Petitioner continually asserted control over 
her and criticized her on a regular basis. 11 
Respondent described a pattern of physical 
abuse that occurred throughout their 
relationship.12 For example, she testified in 
court that Petitioner "tried to kick her in the 
stomach while she was pregnant, pulled her 
out of bed one night when she received a 
wrong number phone call and called her a 
. d d h J: . ,,13 prostitute, an rape er 10ur times. 
Respondent also testified to severe verbal 
and emotional abuse, including Petitioner 
regularly telling her that she was stupid and 
worthless, telling her to kill herself, and 
threatening to take her child away from her. 14 
On November 19, 2008, Respondent 
went to the police station and filed a report 
stating that Petitioner had regularly abused 
her. 15 The police sent Respondent and the 
child to a domestic violence shelter, where 
they resided until July 3, 2009.16 Respondent 
reported that at that point a shelter was not a 
healthy environment in which to raise a 
child.17 Unable to obtain alternative housing, 
Respondent and the child left the United 
Kingdom and moved to the United States, 
where Respondent had family. 18 They have 
resided in New York since July 8, 2009.19 
After Respondent left Petitioner on 
November 19, 2008, Petitioner attempted to 
locate his child within the United Kingdom; 
however, he was unable to do so. 20 Petitioner 
eventually determined his child did not reside 
in the U.K., so he filed a form on March 15, 
2010, with the proper Central Authority for 
England and Wales to have the child returned 
to the United Kingdom. 21 He officially filed 
for Return of Child in the United States 
pursuant to the Hague Convention on 
November 10, 2010.22 
The primary issue addressed by the 
United States Supreme Court, after two 
appeals, was whether the 1-year period for 
guaranteed return of an abducted child under 
the Hague Convention could be equitably 
tolled. 23 The Court questioned whether that 
year began when Petitioner realized his child 
no longer resided within the United 
Kingdom or whether it began on the date 
that he last saw his child. If the period were 
to be equitably tolled, then the "well-settled" 
defense would no longer be an option and 
the child would automatically return to the 
United Kingdom. 24 
The United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York first 
addressed the question of whether 
Respondent's removal of the child was 
wrongful. 25 For removal to be wrongful, 
Petitioner must establish that when the child 
was removed, Petitioner was actively 
exercising his custodial rights or would have 
been had the child not been removed.26 The 
district court ruled that Petitioner had clearly 
met these requirements for establishing a 
prima facie case for wrongful retention. 27 
Therefore, the court would order the return 
of the child to the United Kingdom, unless 
Respondent was able to establish that one of 
the exceptions to the return rule applied. 28 
Respondent argued that two defenses 
applied here-the grave risk exception and 
the "well-settled" defense. The question of 
the "well-settled" defense remained the 
' J: · h 29 pnmary 10cus m t e cases. 
The district court held that the one-
year period could not be extended by 
equitable tolling, at least not in this case.30 The 
court first determined that the one-year 
period was not a statute of limitations.31 It 
then determined that while Petitioner took 
reasonable steps to locate his child, he 
considered that the child might be in the 
United States and still waited eight months to 
file a petition there.32 Hence, unlike other 
cases where equitable tolling was permitted, 
the court determined that Respondent did not 
conceal the child to a degree that would 
trigger equitable tolling.33 After considering 
the totality of the circumstances and the 
child's stability in New York, the court denied 
return of the child.34 
Petitioner filed an appeal with the 
Second Circuit, particularly focusing on the 
"well-settled" defense. 35 He raised three 
objections to the district court's analysis 
regarding this issue.36 First, Petitioner argued 
that Respondent should never have been 
permitted to raise the "well-settled" defense 
because the one-year period that Article 12 
stipulates must pass before such a defense 
can be raised should have been equitably 
tolled. 37 Thus, he argued that the one-year 
period should not start until such time "as he 
could have reasonably located his child."38 
Petitioner's remaining objections were based 
on whether the child was "well-settled" in the 
United States and whether Respondent 
proved this fact by the necessary 
preponderance of the evidence.39 
While analyzing equitable tolling 
under the Hague Convention, the Second 
Circuit followed the well-established premise 
that, while interpreting a treaty, the court 
must begin by looking at the treaty text, and 
then the context in which the written words 
are used. 40 The court also considered that it 
should look beyond the written words and to 
the history of the treaty, the terms of the 
negotiations, and the practical construction 
adopted by the signatory parties to determine 
the meaning of a treaty provision.41 The 
Second Circuit ultimately affirmed the district 
court's ruling, holding that, "while an 
abducting parent's conduct may be taken into 
account when deciding whether a child is 
settled in his or her new environment, the 
one-year period set out in Article 12 is not 
subject to equitable tolling." 42 The court 
found that permitting such a delayed 
consideration of the child's interests would 
undermine the purpose of the Hague 
Convention. 43 
Petitioner filed an appeal with the 
Supreme Court claiming again that equitable 
tolling is applicable under the Hague 
Convention's one-year period and should be 
applied in his case. 44 The Supreme Court set 
an absolute standard that equitable tolling will 
never be considered with regard to the Hague 
Convention in future international parental 
abduction cases.45 
III. Background 
On October 25, 1980, the United 
States drafted an international treaty-the 
Hague Convention-to address the problem 
of international child abduction by a parent. 46 
The Hague Convention was ratified by the 
United States on April 29, 1988, when 
Congress enacted a federal law-International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA)-
that established procedures for implementing 
the Convention in the United States.47 This 
section will first address the purposes for 
implementing the Hague Convention in the 
United States and the affirmative defenses 
available under the Convention. It will then 
specifically focus on equitable tolling of the 
"well-settled" exception, and consider how 
courts within the United States have 
interpreted this issue. 
A. The Hague Convention 
President Ronald Reagan described the 
goals of the Hague Convention to the United 
States Senate as follows: 
"The Convention is designed 
promptly to restore the factual 
situation that existed prior to the 
child's removal or retention. It does 
not seek to settle disputes about legal 
custody rights, nor does it depend 
upon the existence of court orders as 
a condition for returning children. The 
international abductor is denied legal 
advantage from abduction ... as a 
resort to the Convention is to affect 
[sic] the child's swift return to his or 
her circumstances before the 
abduction ... In most cases this will 
mean return to the country of the 
child's habitual residence where any 
dispute about custody rights can be 
heard and settled."48 
The Convention is rooted in the fundamental 
idea that abduction, even by a parent, harms a 
child or children involved. 49 Such harms may 
result from uprooting the child from familiar 
surroundings and breaking the bond with the 
abandoned parent, and they may manifest 
themselves in severe psychological and 
emotional problems.so The Hague 
Convention was enacted so that children 
could be returned to their habitual residences 
before extensive harm is caused by the 
removal.s1 In addition to protecting the 
children the Convention also ensures that 
' 
parents do not manipulate jurisdictional 
differences by moving to a nation where that 
parent would be more likely to benefit, in the 
custodial sense, than he or she would in the 
state of habitual residence.s2 By preventing 
this possibility of unjust enrichment, the 
Convention is expected to deter future 
parental abductions. 
Thus the Convention establishes 
' 
that if the abduction of a child is wrongful 
and has occurred within one year of filing a 
Hague petition for return,s3 that child must 
be automatically returned to his or her 
county of habitual residence so that any 
custody dispute might be litigated in that 
country under its laws.s4 The general return 
rule ensures that these purposes are met and 
thus that the best interests of children in the 
' 
matter are protected. The rule will apply 
unless the abductor is able to demonstrate 
that one of the stated exceptions applies. 
B. Affirmative Defenses Under The Hague 
Convention 
Courts have recognized that the 
general presumption of the Convention-
that abduction is always irreparably harmful 
to children-may be outweighed by other 
interests.ss The Convention establishes 
affirmative defenses, within Article 12 and 
Article 13 for circumstances in which the 
' 
original purpose behind the Convention is 
outweighed by another matter of more 
importance. 
Within Article 13,s6 the Convention 
establishes that the child shall not be 
automatically returned if it is found that 
either the petitioner seeking return was not 
exercising custody rights at the time the 
child was removed, or the abductor had 
consent of the petitioner to remove the 
child.57 Also, under the grave risk exception, 
a court may determine that the child shall 
not be returned to the habitual residence if 
it is determined that there is a "grave risk 
that his or her return would expose the 
child to physical or psychological harm or 
otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation."58 Such a determination requires 
the abducting parent to prove a high 
standard of grave harm, not merely serious 
circumstances. 
The final exception to the general 
rule, and the primary focus in Lozano v. 
Montqya Alvare~ falls under Article 12 of The 
Hague Convention. After the one-year period 
of guaranteed return has expired, a court has 
discretion to evaluate the current 
environment of the child. If the parent is able 
to show that the child has become "well-
settled" in his or her new environment, then 
the court may deny the return. 59 The rationale 
is that it would do the child more harm to 
remove him or her from the current 
environment of stability than that which 
would be gained by returning the child to the 
previous residence. The burden of 
establishing that the child is "well-settled" 
rests with the abducting parent, however, and 
requires substantial testimony. It is under this 
exception that the current equitable tolling 
issue lies, because petitioners prefer that the 
courts not even have discretion to evaluate 
the new environment. These petitioners 
prefer that the one-year return policy 
automatically apply. 
C. Equitable Tolling 
When arguing against a "well-settled" 
defense, petitioners commonly seek the tolling 
of the one-year period stated within the 
Convention.60 When considered in the context 
of federal statutes, equitable tolling pauses the 
running of a statute of limitations when a 
litigant has pursued his rights diligently, but 
has been prevented from bringing a timely 
action by some extraordinary circumstance. 61 
The question of whether equitable 
tolling would also apply to a treaty such as the 
Hague Convention has been inconsistently 
interpreted from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as 
is established in Matovski v. Matovski 62 and 
Duarte v. Bardales. 63 
1. Argument that Equitable Tolling Does Not 
Apply to the Hague Convention 
In Matovski, the petitioner was an 
Australian national and the respondent was an 
American who moved to Australia.64 The 
couple resided in Australia, where they were 
married and had three children together.65 The 
respondent testified that, since the date of 
their marriage on April 8, 1994, she suffered 
severe domestic violence at the hands of the 
petitioner.66 Such abuse encompassed being 
punched, slapped or struck with household 
objects on more than fifty occasions, much of 
which was credible and corroborated by 
police reports.67 The respondent took her 
children to the United States in January 1997 
and remained there for four months to escape 
the abuse; however, the petitioner persuaded 
her to return to Australia with the children. 68 
The respondent did not leave with the 
children for good until May 28, 2005, when 
police were dispatched to the marital home 
following a domestic disturbance call.69 The 
petitioner did not file a petition pursuant to 
the Hague Convention until June 6, 2006, 
more than one year after the children were 
removed the second and final time.70 The 
New York District Court and the respondent 
admitted that a prima facie case for wrongful 
removal was established; however, the 
respondent argued that the "well-settled" 
exception should apply because more than a 
year had passed. 71 
In response to the respondent's 
argument, the petitioner argued that the 
one-year period did not commence until 
June 7, 2006, the date on which he allegedly 
received a phone call from the respondent 
and was informed that she intended to 
remain in New York with the children. 72 
The court ultimately concluded that 
equitable tolling did not apply to the "well-
settled" exception. 73 The court analyzed why 
some other courts have found otherwise and 
determined that the other courts have 
likened the Convention with federal statutes 
of limitations, which can be tolled.74 Other 
courts had been persuaded by a fear that not 
permitting equitable tolling would 
incentivize abducting parents to conceal 
their whereabouts for a year.75 The District 
Court in New York was not persuaded by 
those arguments and concerns.76 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, was 
persuaded by those concerns only one year 
after Matovski, as was demonstrated in 
Duarte.77 
2. Argument that Equitable Tolling Does 
Apply to the Hague Convention 
Duarte not only demonstrated a 
case in which equitable tolling was applied 
to the Hague Convention, but it also 
demonstrated an unusual situation because 
the father abducted the children and 
domestic violence did not appear to play a 
role.78 In the case, a mother, who lived in 
Mexico, petitioned for the return of her 
children under the Hague Convention after 
the father of her four children took the 
two youngest children to California 
without the mother's knowledge or 
permission. 79 The children were taken to 
the United States on July 8, 2003, and the 
mother filed the Hague Petition in Mexico 
in September 2003. 80 However, the mother 
did not file a petition for the return of her 
children in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of California until 
January 23, 2006.81 
At the district level, the mother failed 
to appear before the court for a scheduled 
hearing; therefore, the court denied her Hague 
Petition.82 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in 
evaluating the merits of the mother's petition, 
also addressed the question of whether 
equitable tolling could be applied. The court 
ultimately ruled that the one-year period 
within the Convention could be equitably 
tolled "when circumstances suggest that the 
abducting parent took steps to conceal the 
whereabouts of the child from the parent 
seeking return and such concealment delayed 
the filing of the petition for return." 83 
Matovski and Duarte demonstrate 
that courts in the United States did not 
know how to evaluate equitable tolling of 
the "well-settled" exception or which 
circumstances should even be considered 
in that evaluation. The United States 
Supreme Court settled those questions m 
Lozano v. Montqya Alvarez. 
IV. Instant Decision 
The United States Supreme Court 
analyzed the prior conflicting rulings on the 
applicability of equitable tolling under the 
H C . 84 ague onventlon. The Court sought to 
establish consistency among courts in 
different jurisdictions on the issue.85 
Prior to considering whether equitable 
tolling might be applied to an international 
treaty, the Court looked to equitable tolling of 
federal statutes of limitations.86 The Court 
determined that because these statutes of 
limitations were expressly set by Congress, the 
applicability of equitable tolling is 
fundamentally a question of statutory intent. 87 
Thus, with regard to federal statutes, equitable 
tolling is presumed to apply to statutes of 
limitations unless such tolling would be 
inconsistent with the intent expressed by the 
statute's text.88 The Supreme Court however 
' ' 
recognized that the Hague Convention is a 
treaty and not a federal statute; thus, the 
matters of interpretation and comparison 
might differ. The Court specifically looked to 
whether there was a presumption of equitable 
tolling and whether a statute of limitations 
existed at all. 89 
The Court found no shared 
presumption of equitable tolling with regards 
to treaties.90 The basis behind the 
presumption with federal statutes of 
limitations was that "equitable tolling [was J 
part of the established backdrop of American 
law."91 The problem with carrying this 
presumption over to international treaties is 
that the prime nature of a treaty is that it is a 
contract between multiple nations.92 Thus, in 
interpreting whether such a presumption 
would exist, the Court must consider whether 
it would be an expectation that is shared by all 
of the contracting parties. 93 The expectation 
was not shared by multiple countries; 
therefore, such a presumption does not exist 
under the Hague Convention.94 
The Court also determined that the 
Convention did not contain an expressed 
statute of limitations; thus, the lack of 
presumption did not actually matter. 95 The 
Court evaluated the one-year period expressly 
stated within Article 12 of the Convention by 
considering the general purpose of a statute of 
limitations.96 Mainly, a statute of limitation 
establishes a period of time during which a 
claimant must bring an action.97 Failure to do 
so during that time would cause the claimant 
to lose an opportunity for remedy. 98 Under 
the Hague Convention, however, expiration 
of the one-year period did not eliminate 
remedy. 99 Rather, once the one-year period 
expired, the assigned court was still obligated 
to return the child to the habitual country, 
unless sufficient evidence proves that the child 
was "well-settled" within his or her new 
. 100 environment. 
Thus, unlike general statutes of 
limitations, a remedy still existed after the 
. d . d 101 one-year peno expire . 
After establishing that the 
Convention could not be analogized with 
statutes of limitations and their regular 
practice of equitable tolling, the Court 
considered Petitioner's argument that 
equitable tolling is consistent with the 
purpose of the Convention because it was 
necessary to deter child abductions. The 
Court responded that the goal was not 
absolute, especially when other available 
practices could help to achieve those 
objective.102 The Court also stated that it was 
"unwilling to apply equitable tolling 
principles that would, in practice, rewrite the 
treaty."103 
After its analysis, the Supreme Court 
established that equitable tolling could not be 
applied to The Hague Convention. 
COMMENT 
Not all international parental child 
kidnappings are motivated by domestic 
violence at the hands of the abandoned 
partner; however, the percentage is 
significant. 104 Because such a large fraction of 
child abductions is motivated by a dangerous 
home situation, it is important that 
uniformity exists among the Courts such that 
victims are not forced to endure continued 
abuse. The Supreme Court set an important 
precedent with its ruling in Lozano v. Montqya 
Alvarez by establishing that equitable tolling 
may never be applied to the "well-settled" 
exception under the Hague Convention. In 
so doing, the Court eliminated further 
inconsistent rulings on this issue and ensured 
that the Hague Convention would be 
uniformly implemented as procedurally 
intended by I CARA. The uniformity of the 
courts on this issue will prevent further 
domestic abuse by stopping abusive control 
over child custody, which effectively prevents 
mothers from leaving abusive relationships 
to ensure the safety of their children. 
A. Inconsistencies Regarding the Applicability ef 
Equitable Tolling 
Because the Hague Convention does 
not expressly address the issue of equitable 
tolling within its text; courts throughout the 
United States have considered the issue 
inconsistently. The District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, the same 
court that initially heard the current case, 
ruled that equitable tolling could not apply to 
the Hague Convention.105 However, the Ninth 
Circuit in Duarte v. Bardales found the opposite 
to be true. 106 While the New York case 
involved domestic abuse and the other did 
not, the respective courts did not consider 
that element in their analyses. Rather, the 
primary rationale for permitting equitable 
tolling in the Ninth Circuit was that abductors 
should not be permitted to sneak around and 
hide their identities so that they may be 
unjustly enriched. The Ninth Circuit did not 
consider the fact that some abductors need to 
conceal their locations in order to escape 
abuse. 
This lack of uniformity on the 
equitable tolling issue was problematic. First, 
ICARA, which implements the procedures for 
incorporating the Hague Convention within 
United States federal law, expressly states that 
a "uniform international interpretation of the 
Convention" is needed. 107 Congress explicitly 
required uniform application. Thus, Congress 
also likely intended courts to interpret the 
application of equitable tolling uniformly, 
though the issue is not within the text of the 
Convention. That should set the standard 
among jurisdictions. Second, one of the 
purposes behind the Hague Convention was 
to prevent one parent from advancing her or 
his position in a custody dispute by moving or 
jurisdiction shopping. The interpretation of 
equitable tolling determines whether the 
return of a child to the habitual residence is 
absolute. The jurisdiction shopping that the 
Hague Convention was enacted to prevent 
will likely continue unless a uniform standard 
is set. 
The Supreme Court ensured that the 
original purpose of the Convention 
remained intact and prevented abandoned 
abusers from easy manipulation of the 
Convention to maintain their control and 
abuse over their victims by creating a 
uniform standard amongst jurisdictions in 
the United States. 
B. Detrimental Consequences Avoided 
One implicit objective of the Hague 
Convention was to ensure that the best 
interests of abducted children are protected. 108 
This was the rationale behind the general rule 
of return and the narrowly tailored exceptions 
which, for the most part, require a significant 
degree of evidence to access. However, given 
the large fraction of abduction cases that are 
motivated by domestic violence, it was 
important for the Court to consider the 
impact of the general rule on such victims of 
domestic abuse and whether the exception 
incorporated into the text sufficiently 
protected them.109 
The most commonly argued 
exception, and one that is intended to protect 
such domestic abuse victims, is the grave risk 
exception, under Article 13(b) of the 
Convention. 110 This gives courts discretion to 
refuse the return of a child where there is a 
"grave risk of harm that return ... would 
expose the child to physical or psychological 
harm or otherwise place the child in an ever leaves the dangerous situation. 117 Thus, 
intolerable situation." 111 The drafters relied on domestic abuse curtails the victim's freedom. 
this exception to protect domestic abuse "In order to determine how free someone is, 
situations, but it is insufficient because it 
the significant question concerns not the 
requires a clear and convincing burden of 
range of options that the person has, but 
proof.112 A clear danger to the child must be 
rather the extent to which, and the way in 
established, and courts have ruled that abuse 
which, the person's range of options tracks 
against a mother does not meet the 
standard. 113 While evaluating whether this 
their interests ... What freedom requires is 
exception applies, courts do not commonly 
protection against arbitrary control over 
consider the psychological effect that abuse 
options rather than against non-arbitrary 
between parents often has on a child.114 Also, control over options."
118 
courts do not consider that the culture of The petitioner maintains control 
abuse is concealment and non-reporting such over the other parent by removing 
that little substantial evidence of the abuse 
options if a petitioner under the Hague 
. 115 exists. 
Convention is permitted to manipulate 
Domestic abuse is commonly 
the system with equitable tolling. 
characterized by physical and sexual abuse 
that is clear on the surface, or verbal abuse 
Returning the child to the habitual 
that can be heard, but the real central force of 
residence leaves the victimized parent 
domestic abuse is the control an abuser has with the options of either staying in the 
over his or her victim.116 Abusers use this new residence without his or her child, 
psychological dominance to manipulate and or following the child back to the 
instill fear in their victims, commonly stating environment where the abuse occurred. 
that something bad will occur if the victim It is unlikely that a parent would remain 
in the new residence without his or her 
child, especially because the child would 
now be exposed to the abuser without 
protection from the other parent. 
Therefore, no range of options exists. 
Use of equitable tolling to 
manipulate the system would have removed 
the freedom of victims of domestic violence 
and perpetuated their abusers' control over 
them. The Supreme Court, in their ruling, 
provided these victims of domestic abuse 
with protection. 
V. Conclusion 
International parental child 
kidnapping is a growing concern in today's 
society, especially considering that 
international marriages are on the rise.119 The 
Hague Convention was enacted because the 
prior system in place did not provide much 
protection for the best interests of the 
children involved.120 This international treaty 
was rooted in the general assumption that 
abduction harms children. 121 However, given 
that the majority of international parental 
kidnappings is motivated by women claiming 
escape from violent homes, and that abusive 
homes are harmful to children, this 
presumption is not entirely accurate. 
Courts have generally sought to apply 
the Convention and exceptions stated therein 
to meet the best interests of the child or 
children involved. However, some courts 
have permitted petitioners to manipulate the 
system with application of equitable tolling to 
the "well-settled" exception. If tolling applied 
universally, it would achieve the same effect as 
an absolute return policy-harm the children 
and the abuse victims involved. By permitting 
these petitioners to manipulate the system, 
these courts prolonged domestic abuse 
endured by the abductors, by encouraging the 
control by the abuser. 
The Court in Lozano settled the 
question correctly stating that equitable tolling 
may not be applied to the Hague Convention 
"well-settled" one-year exception. The 
Supreme Court stopped the abusive 
manipulation of child custody and addressed 
domestic abuse to advance the best interests 
of the children. 
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